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conventional bonds and Sukuk announcement on shareholder wealth and their determinants using 79 Sukuks and 87 conventional bonds over the
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return in case of Sukuk and positive in case of conventional bond.
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Islamic debt instruments commonly referred to as Sukuk.2
Sukuk is one of the significant Islamic Shariah compliant
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1 Tel.: þ60 3 89248279; fax: þ60 3 89248019.
2 Sukuk is an Arabic term for the plural of ‘suk’, which means certificate.
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007) defined Sukuk as participation rights in the un-
derlying assets. Based on this definition, shares, notes, unit trust and bonds are
all Sukuk. However, there is a great tendency among practitioners to use Sukuk
interchangeably with bond.
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entities compared to the conventional bonds. Sukuk is an
innovative debt security which is similar to the conventional
bond with respect to cash flow and risk. The last decade was
the spectator of the unprecedented proliferation for Sukuk
especially before the global financial crisis. Sukuk had
emerged as one of the important components of global Islamic
Financial System. Over the recent past years, the Sukuk
market has witnessed approximately 10%e15% growth rate to
reach US$ 170 billion outstanding portfolio at the end of 3rd
quarter in 2011 (Global Sukuk Report, 2011). It contributes
approximately 14.3% of the global Islamic finance asset.
The emergence of the Islamic banking and finance industry
in modern economies, particularly in the Arab Gulf and some
Southeast Asian states reflects an attempt to create a semi-
independent financial system under the prevailing system.
This feature has also characterized the creation of the Islamic
capital markets within the prevailing conventional capital
markets. One incontrovertible fact about Sukuk and bonds isting by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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ulations relating to Shariah compliance. Apart from the
fundamental Shariah concepts that underlie the different
structures of Sukuk, the execution of the contracts is generally
patterned after conventional bonds (Cakir & Raei, 2007). This
does not undermine the usual controversy and myths sur-
rounding the differences between Sukuk and conventional
bonds. While Miller, Challoner, and Atta (2007) believe Sukuk
and their returns mimic conventional bonds, Cakir and Raei
(2007) argue that Sukuk are different from bonds, especially
when one considers the diversification advantages which
reduce the risk of portfolio.
Another major difference between Sukuk and conventional
bonds is asset ownership which is borne out of the general
structures of Islamic finance products. To a large extent, Sukuk
holders own part of the underlying assets in any Sukuk
transaction depending on the extent of their investment which
determines the share they are entitled to. On the other hand,
the nature of conventional bonds does not allow such type of
ownership since the securities are considered debt obligations.
The bonds are merely debt obligations issued to the bond
holders by the issuer as a proof of the existence of a debt. No
ownership in the business, joint venture or project is conferred
on the bond holder. Consequently, while Sukuk represents a
share in the project, business or joint venture, the conventional
bonds merely represent a share in the total debt (Jamaldeen,
2012).
The recent controversy over whether some Sukuk actually
comply with the precepts of Shariah suggests that Sukuk are
generally structured along conventional rules of asset securi-
tization. This raises the question of whether these innovative
financial instruments are really all that different from con-
ventional bonds. Wilson (2008) argues that issuers make
special efforts to render Sukuk identical to conventional se-
curities so unfamiliar investors can assess the risk of these new
investments. Such Sukuk essentially mirror conventional se-
curities, defeating the notion of product innovation in Islamic
finance industry.
These concerns are also backed by renowned Shariah
scholars. According to the President of the AAOIFI Shariah
Council, Mohammad Taqi Usmani, current practices of issuing
Sukuk replicate the structure of conventional bonds in terms of
lack of ownership, right to a fixed return, and the guarantee of
repayment of principal making most Sukuk un-Islamic.
Usmani (2007) argues against seeking international bond rat-
ings, since Sukuk can be rated by the recently established
regional ratings agency (like Rating Agency Malaysia), if
needed and Islamic banks should stand ready to endorse the
acceptability of Sukuk.
Even with these controversies surrounding the issuance of
Sukuk, Sukuk have witnessed strong surge in the issuance in
Malaysia and Gulf Co-operation Council countries, there is
strong evidence on Europe, Japan and Korea patronizing
Sukuk in their respective countries. The continual growth of
Sukuk has raised question whether Sukuk can play the role of
an alternative source of financing which might replace the
conventional bond. This study will give us the opportunity tocompare between Sukuk and conventional bond with respect
to market perception regarding these two alternative sources of
financing.
The increasing use of Sukuk to raise capital is proven to
have a positive effect on the Islamic capital market and overall
the fund management industry, but its effect on shareholders’
wealth is unclear especially during volatile global financial
market. This is the first time the wealth effect of Sukuk issue
announcement will be compared to that of conventional bond
issue announcement considering three distinct period of time
(before the global financial crisis, during the global financial
crisis and after the global financial crisis). As the global
financial crisis of 2007e2008 changed the whole dynamics of
the financial sector in the world, this paper will try to explore
contrasting difference between the wealth effects of Sukuk and
conventional bond announcements surrounding the crisis
period. Thus, the findings of paper will provide a comparative
analysis of Sukuk and conventional bonds based on the mar-
ket’s sensitivity of these alternative financing instruments.
The findings of the paper will also try to resolve some of
the myths surrounding the differences between Sukuk and
conventional bonds. There is on-going discussion on whether
Sukuk are different from conventional bonds. Cakir and Raei
(2007) claim that Sukuk are different from bonds since they
have diversification advantages especially of risk reduction
when added to a basket of fixed income securities but others
like Miller et al. (2007) and Wilson (2008) take an opposite
stand to show that Sukuk returns are structured to imitate
features of conventional bond. To overcome this conflicting
stand we analysis stock market reaction to address this un-
solved puzzle.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 discusses the related literature and the theoretical framework
guiding the study. Section 3 provides the sample description
and research methodology adopted to achieve the objectives of
the study. Section 4 discusses the findings and finally paper is
concluded in Section 5.
2. Literature review
It has been documented in Islamic capital market literature
that Sukuk serve as a vital tool for resource mobilization and a
key instrument for the development of Islamic financial in-
dustry (Jobst, Kunzel, Mills, & Sy, 2008; Wilson, 2008). But
very few studies empirically focus on their specific charac-
teristics or stock market reactions to their issuance. Jobst et al.
(2008) in their seminal paper summarizes some of the issues
encompassing the Sukuk market. They advocate that, despite
the global financial crisis, there is still a strong demand from
both Islamic countries and conventional financial institutions
for Shariah compliant securities like Sukuk.
Sukuks are also criticized on the precepts that they are
commonly structured along similar lines of asset securitization
as done in conventional finance thus raising the doubt over the
uniqueness of Sukuk as innovative financial instruments. This
notion is further supported by Wilson (2008) who argues that
issuers apply special attention to issue those Sukuk which are
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risk assessment of Sukuk. Thus, Sukuk replicate conventional
bonds, suggesting that the Islamic finance industry is lagging
in areas of product innovation and pricing risk characteristics.
Diverging from above preposition, Cakir and Raei (2007)
take an opposing stand and propose that Sukuk are different
from conventional bonds when it comes to risk reduction
benefits. Using a sample of sovereign Sukuk and Eurobonds
by the same issuer, the authors calculate and compare the
value-at-risk (VaR) for a portfolio including both instruments
to another portfolio containing Eurobonds only. The results
show that VaR is reduced for the portfolio containing Sukuk
along with fixed-income securities, inferring that Sukuk does
have some diversification advantages for the investors.
In order to test the difference in wealth effect of both Sukuk
and conventional bond we rely on traditional financial models.
One of the early theoretical models investigating the wealth
effect of financial securities is the asymmetric information
model based on the works of Myers and Majluf (1984). Myers
and Majluf (1984) in their pecking order theory proved that
the managers have more information than investors due to
asymmetric information. One of the appealing attribute of the
model explains the reason for fall in stock price when firms
announce the stock issuance to finance their investment, and
why stock prices do not fall if debt is issued.
Another theoretical model which explains this phenomenon
is based on the signaling theory given by Kim (1990) who
employs a signaling equilibrium to explain market reactions to
announcement of convertible bonds, straight bonds and com-
mon stocks. The study shows that the conversion ratio of
convertible bond gives a reliable signal of firm’s future
earnings.
Numerous studies have been carried out to investigate the
wealth effects of bond announcements and results obtained
thus far are mixed and indecisive. Howton, Howton, and
Perfect (1998) attempted to investigate Jensen’s free cash
flow argument relating to straight bond issuance. They found
that market reacts negatively to straight bond issuances made
by industrial companies and that the announcement day re-
action is inversely related to the level of free cash flow prior to
the debt issue and inversely related to the investment oppor-
tunities of the firm. Harvey, Lins, and Roper (2003) provided
evidence that debt creates shareholder value for firms’ with
high managerial agency costs. While Arshanapalli, Fabozzi,
Switzer, and Gosselin (2004) documented that firms
announcement of convertible bonds can lead to negative
abnormal returns. This result contradicts the findings of Kang
and Stulz (1996) and De Roon and Veld (1998) which showed
that announcements of convertible bonds were linked with
insignificantly positive abnormal returns. Ammann, Fehr, and
Seiz (2006) in their study on the announcements and issuance
effects of convertible bonds and exchangeable bonds for the
German and Swiss market found significant negative abnormal
returns on the announcement day and no significant returns on
the issuance day. In a more recent study, Shao, Sheng, Hsing,
and Chia (2007) examine the role of investment opportunities
and free cash flow in explaining the source of the stockvaluation effects of secured debt offerings. The results showed
a significantly positive relation between a firm’s investment
opportunities and its stock price to announcements of secured
debt issues.
In only comparative study available in literature on Sukuk
and conventional bond, Ashhari, Chun, and Nassir (2009)
found that there is a wealth effect on the Sukuk issues
announcement but not in case of the conventional bond
announcement. Their study further established that the size of
the bond offering establishes as significant factor of stock
return for both Sukuk and conventional bonds, but the sign for
Sukuk was negative and contrary to conventional bond. Since
this study was only based on Malaysian sample, the results
could not be generalized for the global Islamic financial
market. Our study is an enhancement from Ashari et al. (2009)
in two ways. Firstly, by incorporating Sukuk and conventional
bond samples from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan,
UAE, Bahrain and Qatar markets. Secondly, the regression
model is further enhanced by including free cash flow as
significant factor of stock returns for Sukuk and conventional
bonds.
In a related study Ahmad and Radzi (2011) investigated the
role of prevailing economic conditions in the country on the
issuance of Sukuk and conventional bond. The study found
significant effects of GDP, Malaysian Ringgit exchange rate
with USD and market liquidity on the issuance of Sukuk in
Malaysian capital market whereas conventional bonds issu-
ance was only affected by exchange rate. The authors failed to
empirically prove the role of financial crisis on the issuance of
both type of debt instruments. In order to capture the true role
of financial crisis on the decision to issue Sukuk or conven-
tional bonds, our study will divide the sample period in three
groups namely pre-crisis, during crisis and post-crisis period.
However, this study is distinctive and varies from previous
studies since it focuses on the difference between wealth effect
of conventional bond and Sukuk announcements during both
normal time and volatile financial period. Much has been said
on global platform about the resilience of Islamic finance
during 2007 global financial crisis. World Bank (2012) high-
lighted that in recent years, Islamic financial assets has grown
exponentially and generally outperformed conventional
financial instruments, mainly following the onset of the
financial crisis of 2008.
3. Data and methodology
The sample of Sukuk and conventional bonds issues spans
from 2004 to 2012 and data has been extracted from Bloom-
berg. The sample size is determined by available information
on all requested variables, particularly closing stock prices for
firms issuing debt for a time span long enough before the
actual announcement date of the issue in order to calculate
abnormal returns. Our final sample comprises 166 issues (79
Sukuk and 87 conventional bonds). Sample was chosen from
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Pakistan, UAE, Bahrain and
Qatar which has distinction of developed Islamic capital
market (Alam, 2012). In our sample, no firm has issued both
25N. Alam et al. / Borsa I_stanbul Review 13 (2013) 22e29Sukuk and conventional bonds during the period of study,
implying that our analysis compares two different populations
of securities’ issuers. Furthermore, in order to study the global
financial crisis on financial market, the whole study period is
divided into three parts. The first period is pre-crisis
(2004e2006) followed by during crisis (2007e2009) and
finally, the post-crisis period (2010e2012).
It can be seen from Table 1 that the mean leverage (debt/
total asset) ratio for the companies issued Islamic bond is
0.3437 while the ratio is higher (0.4218) for the companies
issued conventional bond during the whole period
(2004e2012). We find that companies issuing Sukuk tend to
be smaller than conventional bond issuers, both in terms of
balance sheet assets and market valuation. In addition, the
mean cumulative abnormal return (the dependent variable) for
the Islamic bond issuer is 1.5072% within the time period
3 to þ3 of announcement date with higher Standard devia-
tion (10.97). On the other hand, the cumulative abnormal re-
turn for the conventional bond issuer is 1.30% with
comparatively lower standard deviation of 4.79 for the same
time frame.
Following Godlewski, Turk-Ariss, and Weill (2010, 2011),
we use market model event study methodology to calculate the
abnormal returns (AR) around announcement of Sukuk or
conventional bond issuance. The AR is used to measure the
performance of stock prices of firms on certain days to reflect
the investors’ reaction to announcement and is calculated as:
ARit ¼ Rit  ðaiþ biRmtÞ;
where ARit is the abnormal returns on stock i during period t,
Rit is the observed returns on stock i during period t, Rmt is the
market portfolio returns in period t, ai is the constant average
return of stock i and bi is the beta estimate of stock i.
The date of announcement is treated as day 0. We estimate
market model parameters over the period (60, 60). This
screening reduces the sample size to companies that have at
least 120 days of stock returns. We examine one-day [0,0],
three-day [1,þ1] and seven-day [3,þ3] event windows and
calculate average abnormal daily returns. We obtain cumula-
tive average abnormal returns (CAARs) by summing daily
excess returns over the respective event windows.
A multivariate regression was then estimated to determine
the nature of relationship between anticipated variables and
abnormal returns associated with debt announcements using
the following model:Table 1
Descriptive statistics by type of issue.
Variables Sukuk Conventional bond
Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev. N
CAR 1.5072 10.973 79 1.30 4.79 87
Firm size 2.6720E9 7.68990E9 79 5.2292E9 7.68388E9 87
Free cash flow 1.8885E8 3.35655E8 79 2.1108E8 5.30080E8 87
Leverage 0.3437 0.16928 79 0.4218 0.20670 87CAAR ð  3;þ3Þ ¼ aOFRþ bSIZEþ cFCFþ dLEV
þ dSHARþ 3
where: OFR is ratio of size of bond offering divided by total
asset for the period prior to the announcement, SIZE is the size
of issuer, estimated by the natural log of its total asset; FCF is
the level of free cash flows of issuer. FCF ¼ (operating
income  interest  net taxes)/BV asset, where
taxes ¼ current tax  change in differed tax (as in Howton
et al., 1998; Shao et al., 2007). LEV is the level of leverage
of firm, where LEV ¼ total firm debt/total asset for the period
before the announcement date. SHAR is the Shariah compliant
status of firm where SHAR ¼ 1 if firm is Shariah compliant
and 0 otherwise. 3is error term.
4. Findings and discussion
The summary results of cumulative average abnormal re-
turn (CAAR) for the full sample and three chosen sub sample
periods are shown in Table 2. Using the event window of (0, 0;
1, 1; and 3, þ3), we note that computed CAARs are
insignificantly positive for conventional bonds and insignifi-
cantly negative for Sukuk for overall period and pre-crisis
period. The CAARs of Sukuk and conventional bond issues,
however, are negative and significant during crisis period.
Furthermore, the percentage of negative Sukuk CAAR is
higher than the corresponding value for conventional bonds.
Meanwhile, cumulative return for Sukuk issue after crisis
period is positive and significant at 5% which confirms wealth
creation for the shareholders of firm offering Sukuk. This
finding validates the results of Mikkelson and Partch (1986),
which states that certain types of debts instruments can lead to
abnormal return. On the other hand, no wealth effect is found
for conventional bond announcement after crisis period. This
is in line with Eckbo (1986) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986)
findings, which states that stock markets do not react to debt
announcements including bond issuances.
We test the statistical significance of CAARs applying a
simple time-series test (Brown & Warner, 1985). Since de-
viations from the iid normal assumption of the aforementioned
test are highly likely in event studies, we additionally apply
various robust test statistics. We calculate the Patell (1976)
standardized residuals test that is robust to heteroscedastic
event period abnormal returns. Moreover, we apply the stan-
dardized cross-sectional test introduced by Boehmer,
Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) that is additionally robust to
event-induced variance increases.
Our empirical results on CAARs of Sukuk and conven-
tional bond issuance in different economic conditions high-
lights three observations linked to Sukuk and conventional
bond issues: 1) lack of significant stock market reactions to
conventional bond and Sukuk announcements over a larger
time frame, 2) the high negative reaction to Sukuk issues than
conventional bonds during global financial crisis period, and,
3) the significant positive stock market reactions to Sukuk
issue in post-crisis period.
Table 2
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for period (0, 0; 1, 1; 3, þ3 days).
Event window Overall period
(2004e2012)
Mean CAAR
Pre-crisis period
(2004e2007)
Mean CAAR
During crisis period
(2008e2009)
Mean CAAR
Post-crisis period
(2010e2012)
Mean CAAR
Sukuk (79)a Bond (87) Sukuk (26) Bond (30) Sukuk (26) Bond (29) Sukuk (27) Bond (28)
[0,0] 2.367
(0.353)b
(0.987)c
(0.127)d
0.654
(0.248)
(0.213)
(0.652)
1.021
(0.118)
(0.843)
(0.335)
0.741
(0.251)
(1.023)
(0.423)
2.521
(0.022)**
(2.15)**
(2.14)**
1.052
(0.0167)**
(2.35)**
(2.41)**
0.631
(0.08)***
(4.13)***
(8.43)**
1.652
(0.156)
(0.851)
(0.632)
[1,1] 1.995
(0.264)
(1.024)
(0.851)
0.871
(0.324)
(0.489)
(1.412)
1.102
(0.217)
(0.792)
(0.114)
1.142
(0.192)
(1.22)
(0.495)
2.667
(0.018)**
(2.053)**
(2.313)**
1.942
(0.0310)**
(2.117)**
(2.003)**
0.701
(0.025)**
(2.301)**
(2.143)**
0.874
(0.334)
(0.749)
(0.621)
[3,3] 1.703
(0.275)
(0.743)
(0.961)
1.301
(0.456)
(0.185)
(0.247)
1.320
(0.135)
(0.954)
(0.718)
1.831
(0.296)
(0.527)
(0.241)
4.047
(0.028)**
(2.00)**
(2.112)**
3.117
(0.0197)**
(2.253)**
(2.179)**
0.964
(0.045)**
(2.456)**
(2.222)**
0.668
(0.226)
(0.921)
(0.829)
a ¼ Number of issuance; b ¼ p-values for t-tests; c ¼ BMP-test; d ¼ Patell Z.
** ¼ Significance at 5%; *** ¼ Significance at 10%.
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to either conventional bond or Sukuk announcements (full
period and pre-crisis period) is in line with Eckbo (1986),
which confirms that stock markets do not react to debt an-
nouncements. The stock market’s reaction to the issue of
bonds is prejudiced by opposing effects in the sense that bond
issuance may send a reliable signal about the quality of firms
thus reducing the adverse selection problem resulting from
information asymmetries between managers (Ross, 1977). It
can also reduce agency costs and moral hazard behavior due to
conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers
(Jensen, 1986). In contrast, stock markets could react nega-
tively to debt issue since debt increases the bankruptcy risk of
the borrower as well as increases the agency costs due to
conflicting interest between shareholders and debt holders
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, we can interpret that the
absence of any significant wealth effect of Sukuk or bond
announcements in the global market is the result of these
opposing effects.
However, we find a noteworthy difference in stock market
reaction to Sukuk and conventional bond issues during crisis
period, following the comparatively larger negative reaction to
Sukuk announcement to the smaller negative return to con-
ventional bond announcement. Overall both conventional
bonds and Sukuk issues sent negative signal to market con-
firming the loss of investors’ faith in firms resorting to cheap
source of financing. To explain why Sukuk issuance created
more negative impact than conventional bonds issuance, we
suggest that only borrowers who have low return expectations
will have an enticement towards Sukuk. If issuers expect a low
profit, they will prefer profit-and-loss sharing financing
schemes to minimize their loss in the event of failure. If is-
suers expect a high return, they will prefer interest-based
financing to maximize their gain in the event of success. As
a result, stock market participants will expect less informed
borrowers to choose to issue Sukuk and will interpret such
issuance as a negative signal on the financial position of theissuing firm. Moreover, due to a strong demand for Sukuk
from Muslim nations and Islamic banks associated with the
limited supply of Sukuk in the market leads to an excess de-
mand for Sukuk that makes these instruments more popular
and easier to market than conventional bonds. Thus, com-
panies that are financially weak and are not in a position to
issue a conventional bond might still have access to financing
through Sukuk issuance. Market takes this as a credible signal
and does not react positively to the Sukuk issuance.
One probable explanation for the positive wealth effect of
Islamic bond issuance announcements relative to conventional
bond issuance announcements in post-crisis period is that the
larger investor base for Islamic debt securities relative to that
for conventional debt created cost advantages for Sukuk
issuing firms leading to a lower cost of capital. One more
plausible explanation will be huge demand for asset backed
Sukuks in global market post-crisis period (Ernst & Young,
2012). Additionally, announcements of Islamic debt offering
enhance the Shariah compliance status of issuing companies
attracting more and more investors which led to stock price
increase.
If we focus on regression model for both Sukuk and con-
ventional bond announcements we find contrasting result for
different time period. The regression models are free of mul-
ticollinearity, serial correlation and heteroscedasticity prob-
lems. The output of the regression analysis for overall period
is presented in Table 3. For Sukuk issuance, coefficient of
OFR is 0.0061 and significant at 5%. This significant
negative coefficient means that the bigger the Sukuk issuance
size, the smaller the CAAR. By contrast, we have positive
relationship between offering size and CAAR of conventional
bond announcement. The coefficient value of OFR is 0.0187
and statistically significant at 1%. Result specifies that con-
ventional bond issuance size has positive impact on the
abnormal return. This may suggest that investors perceived
bigger conventional bond issue as an indicator of sound signal
of improved performance of firm consistent with signaling
Table 3
Regression results for overall sample (2004e2012).
Variable Sukuk Conventional bonds
Constant 3.45 (0.264) 0.733 (0.641)
OFR 0.0061 (0.0321)** 0.0187 (0.006)*
Firm size 0.018 (0.345) 0.0123 (0.412)
Free cash flow 0.091 (0.049)** 0.0153 (0.241)
Leverage 9.286 (0.217) 2.095 (0.615)
Shariah compliance 0.000 (0.441) 0.998 (0.438)
R-square 0.151 0.201
N 79 87
Note: value in parentheses denotes significance value; **, * ¼ Significance at
5% and 1% respectively.
Table 4
Regression results for pre-crisis sample.
Variable Sukuk Conventional bonds
Constant 6.32 (0.238) 18.043 (0.111)
OFR 0.0029 (0.0412)** 0.0138 (0.012)**
Firm size 1.254 (0.962) 0.0032 (0.069)***
Free cash flow 0.113 (0.776) 3.833 (0.144)
Leverage 21.877 (0.120) 27.356 (0.120)
Shariah compliance 0.000 (0.241) 6.710 (0.259)
R-square 0.123 0.426
N 26 30
Note: value in parentheses denotes significance value; ***, **,
* ¼ Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Table 6
Regression results for post-crisis sample.
Variable Sukuk Conventional bonds
Constant 4.999 (0.501) 2.439 (0.161)
OFR 0.0784 (0.251) 0.0752 (0.026)
Firm size 2.421 (0.726) 1.977 (0.579)
Free cash flow 1.511 (0.076) 1.103 (0.156)
Leverage 12.445 (0.483) 10.064 (0.072)***
Shariah compliance 0.000 (0.208) 0.356 (0.851)
R-square 0.145 0.190
N 27 28
Note: value in parentheses denotes significance value; *** ¼ Significance
at 10%.
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free cash flow and CAAR of Sukuk issuance. This signifies
that firms with more free cash flow when issue Sukuk; transmit
negative signals to the market which can be due to asymmetric
information theory.
When we divide the regression results into three time
period of pre-crisis, during crisis and post-crisis period we
observe some contrasting results. These results are shown in
Tables 4e6.
For pre-crisis period results (Table 4) are very much similar
to overall period. The only notably difference is the positive
relationship between the firm size and CAAR for conventional
bond issuance. This indicates that big firms issuing conven-
tional bond will generate greater abnormal return which is
seen as a positive move from bigger firms by investors. The
firms are utilizing their size advantages and public attention to
further leverage their earnings.Table 5
Regression results for during crisis sample.
Variable Sukuk Conventional bonds
Constant 0.208 (0.939) 9.453 (0.033)
OFR 1.085 (0.023)** 0.0249 (0.154)
Firm size 0.008 (0.541) 0.357 (0.715)
Free cash flow 0.271 (0.365) 1.569 (0.532)
Leverage 1.387 (0.478) 1.519 (0.012)**
Shariah compliance 0.000 (0.510) 1.706 (0.631)
R-square 0.182 0.236
N 26 29
Note: value in parentheses denotes significance value; **, * ¼ Significance at
5% and 1% respectively.The market reaction to Sukuk issuance is found to be
positively related to the size of issuance during the crisis
period (Table 5). This means that if the size of issuance is
large, firms are considered of high investment potential, the
abnormal return would be higher. The results also highlighted
negative relation between leverage and CAAR in case of
conventional bond issuance. This negative relation between
stock returns and leverage suggests that leverage is priced by
the market.
Table 6 presents the regression results for post-crisis sam-
ple. Leverage continues to have significant negative relation-
ship with CAAR for conventional bond issuance. This can be
due to the reason that market is precarious with the firms
which are more geared after the crisis period.
5. Conclusion
Much discussion on Sukuk has centered around the Shariah
compliant and capital market issues with limited literature on
the corporate finance perspective of Islamic bond issues. This
study investigated the comparative wealth effect of Sukuk and
conventional bond announcements on stock returns in major
Islamic financial market.
Through an event study analysis, the study found the
absence of significant stock-market reaction to conventional
bond and Sukuk announcements over a larger time frame.
Furthermore, we can explain the negative cumulative average
abnormal return in case of Sukuk for before and during the
2007 global financial crisis (1.32%, 4.04%) from the par-
ticipants expectation point of view. As per the adverse selec-
tion mechanism, it is the assumption of the investors that those
companies which are not strong enough prefer to issue Islamic
bond as they will be able to share the loss in the worst case
scenario. Therefore, announcement of Sukuk provide the
negative signal in the market which is reflected in the negative
Cumulative average abnormal return found in all the three
period in this study. On the other hand, the positive cumulative
average abnormal return for the conventional bond issue
announcement before the global financial crisis can be
attributed to the fact that those companies which are expected
to earn high profit issue conventional bond so that they can pay
a fixed amount to the investors and take the remaining profit in
order to optimize their outcome. So, this might give positive
signal to the investors which is reflected in the positive
28 N. Alam et al. / Borsa I_stanbul Review 13 (2013) 22e29cumulative average abnormal return for the conventional
bonds before the global financial crisis though the scenario is
different in during and after global financial crisis (3.11%
and 0.66%). During the global financial crisis, the cumula-
tive average abnormal return resulting from the Islamic bond
issue announcement (4.04%) is more worse compared to that
of conventional bond issue announcement (3.11%). This
means that only borrowers with the lowest return expectations
will have an inducement to prefer Sukuk. If issuers expect a
low profit, they will prefer profit-and-loss sharing financing
schemes to minimize their loss in the event of failure. If is-
suers expect a high return, they will prefer interest-based
financing to maximize their gain in the event of success. As
a result, stock market participants will expect less informed
borrowers to choose to issue Sukuk and will interpret such
issuance as a negative signal on the financial position of the
issuing firm.
Our interpretation of the findings is empirically supported
by differences in the characteristics of the issuers of Sukuk and
conventional bonds. Companies issuing Sukuk are notably less
leveraged, less profitable and are in worse financial and
operating shape compared to those issuing conventional
bonds. Hence, these weaker companies may have economic
incentives to prefer issuing a security based on Islamic finance
principles such as profit-and-loss sharing principle rather than
a fixed-income instrument that imposes more financial burden.
Our conclusion regarding the negative market reaction to
Sukuk issues during the crisis period in comparison with
insignificant reaction to conventional bond issues has several
implications. The first one concern the fact that stock market
participants are able to distinguish between Sukuk and con-
ventional bonds characteristics as proposed by Cakir and Raei
(2007) and opposite to the arguments of Wilson (2008) and
Miller et al. (2007). Thus, even though Sukuk might be similar
to conventional bonds structure, stock market participants
perceive these instruments as being alternative financial tools
and accordingly they react differently to their issuance.
Furthermore regression analysis provides more explana-
tions for the sources of wealth effect of Islamic bond an-
nouncements. For Sukuk issuance, we found negative
relationship between offer size of Sukuks and CAAR while
result indicated that the relative offering size of conventional
bond has positive impact on the abnormal return. This may
indicate that investors perceived bigger conventional bond
issues as an indicator of improved firms’ performance which is
consistent with signaling theory.
Therefore, the findings of this study are pertinent to the two
unresolved issues related to Islamic financial instruments. The
first issue is relevant to the fact that several characteristics of
Islamic bond are similar to that of traditional conventional
bonds (Ayub, 2007). On the other hand, regarding economic
value of expanding the Islamic finance, it can be said that the
announcement effect of Sukuk is negative for most of the
periods. So, in the short run perspective the effect of
announcement of Sukuk on firm value is negative while the
effect of announcement of conventional bond is positive for all
periods except for post-crisis period. Therefore, in spite ofhaving the religious motivation to issue Sukuk, the negative
effect might hinder the companies to go for Sukuk in order to
raise fund. Though the adverse selection mechanism is there
for raising fund through Sukuk, the long term outcome of
issuing Sukuk needs to be considered.References
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